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ABSTRACT
• This is a brief summary of the vary early days of Aerospaceplane propulsion and
concept research, from a viewpoint based in the Astro Division of Marquardt Aircraft
Company in the years listed, with some view into later times that were on Bill
Escher's watch and other's. The following speakers will discuss other groups who
were pursuing the same goals by various routes. Our chief purpose is to bring out
background information that may be of value to members of this workshop and future
workers in the field.
Many old reports have been amassed by Battelle, (Ref 1), but we notice that most of
the earliest work in Marquardt Company Reports is omitted. (Some have since been
supplied to Battelle, and are now in their files). Also several ICAS and AGARD
proceedings which are not cited carried U.S. work to a world audience. And
Swithenbank and others overseas also contributed to the field.
Or0anizations and Peoole: There were three main groups (Figure 1) doing the engine
research and conceptual work; Marquardt, APL/JHU, and GASL. Several companies
were involved in engine development and production, and no less than seven major
airframe companies were doing active design studies. There is not enough room here
to even list the many DeODle involved, but a few key players must be named. At APL
there were Avery, Dugger, and Billig, who is with us today. At GASL, Tony Ferri, and
SanLorenzo, who is here today. At Marquardt/ASTRO, Some key people on our team
were Carl Builder (my good right arm), Gene Perchonek, and AI Goidstein. There were
also several staff specialists, such as Artur Mager, G.V. Roe, Paul Arthur, who
assisted in such areas as hypersonic flow, external burning, heat transfer, equilibrium
chemistry, etc. And Roy Marquardt himself, who knew how to draw together a team
of rather wild horses and keep them aimed in useful directions.
Technoloov in Hand: The state of engine and airframe technology at those times must
be understood to make sense of the effort (Figure 2). Operational kerosene fueled
ramjets were routinely flying Mach 2-3 in the Bomarc and Talos interceptors. One
Marquardt ramjet had accelerated a Lockheed X-7 test vehicle to about Mach 4.7 in
an all-out test, holding it at nearly 1 "G" until the fuel ran out. But the recovered
engine and airframe were badly overheated, and not reflyable. Titanium skins,
l-I
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19920012275 2020-03-17T13:10:51+00:00Z
carbon/carbon, and composites were not yet available. Engines used the heavier
stainless steel, Inconel, and superalloys in high temperature parts. Ablation heat
shields had been developed for Reentry Vehicles, but radiation cooling was still
primitive.
Technoloov in Develooment: Prototype liquid hydrogen fueled ramjets with
regenerative cooling were in development for Mach 6-8 operation. The inlet and
exhaust nozzle area ratios of such engines were very high, and inlet starting and
stability issues were not well understood. Internal heat transfer rates could exceed
those of LH2/LOX rockets, which were still under development. The total internal
exposed area had to be minimized so that the total cooling load would not exceed the
regenerative fuel cooling capacity. The resulting engine designs were unusual in
appearance.
Ramiet Technoloav: Many related propulsion technology developments were under
way at Marquardt and elsewhere (Figure 3}. There were tests of many different ramjet
fuels, including hydrogen, hydrocarbons, boron hydrides, pentaborane, tri-ethyl
aluminum, tri-ethyl boron, boron and aluminum slurries, and powered metals. There
were tests of both liquid propellant ramrockets (with Rocketdyne}, and solid propellant
ramrockets (with Thiokol). A rocket-convertible ramjet engine called the "Hyperjet"
was proposed for Aerospaceplane use. Tests and analyses were begun of a rotary jet-
bladed compressor, as proposed by Foe, with either rocket or LACE as a jet source.
Propulsion and maneuvering by external free-stream burning was also analyzed and
tested.
LACE-Related tQ_;hnoloov: The Liquid Air Cycle Engine was invented at Marquardt in
1958, causing great'excitement. It was first proposed to the Admiral Radford
Committee by Marquardt and Boeing for first stages of _ space boosters.
But we soon realized that the engine raised the possibility of a single stage reusable
space booster with airplane-type operation, as first reported in 1959 (Ref 2).
During the following three years, the LACE concept combined with the
Aerospaceplane concept led to a proliferation of engine and engine system inventions
in which most of our group and many from other companies were caught up. The
basic low weight and high thrust of the LACE were remarkable. But the engine used
6 to 8 times more fuel than the engine could burn. First there was Carl Builder's basic
scheme to economize on the fuel, followed by several variations on the theme. Next,
various engines were hybridized to it to usefully burn the excess fuel. A few of these
were the Ramlace, Scramlace, Superlace, Nuclear LACE, Lace turborocket, and
LACErocket. There were probably 50 to 100 variants examined.
The use of Slush hydrogen, a s!urry of liquid and solid, was proposed to reduce the
excess fuel use. It could be used or recycled to the tanks. Liquid air could be stored
in low to medium Mach number flight, to be burned as oxidizer later, in rocket mode.
The oxygen could be separated from the air, for storage without the nitrogen. Archie
Gay and Bill Bond at General Dynamics/Convair seized upon this route very early in
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the effort, and exploited it to the limit.
- Perhaps the most difficult problem we had was that in such a flurry of invention, it
requires about a hundred times more manpower to do adequate design studies, weight
analyses, performance analyses, and system trade-offs on each concept than it takes
to invent it. Our efforts to manage this problem are discussed below.
Suoersonic Combustion: Supersonic combustion in a detonation wave, with subsonic
or transonic wave exit flow had been demonstrated in our labs and others. We felt
that the resulting "shock" losses would be too great, and that for very high Mach
number flight we must have combustion with Ji_ exit flow, which we titled
"Hypersonic Combustion', a name that never took. Our test people demonstrated the
process. This reduced the estimated diffusion and combustion losses, so that analysis
indicated we could exceed rocket propellant specific impulse to orbital speed end
beyond.
This fed back immediately into our Aerospaceplane efforts, extending our sights
beyond the Mach 6-10 maximum, to any speed that could be endured by the vehicle
in the atmosphere.
Hardware and TestinQ: A large amount of experimental work was done to support
these various proposals. Air liquefaction was demonstrated in 1960, using an Air
Research heat exchanger, followed quickly by the addition of a rocket engine to burn
the products. Supersonic combustion, of both internal and external burning types was
demonstrated, using pebble bed heaters to attain full temperature simulation to about
Mach 7+. Ramrocket mixing and combustion tests were run, using Rocketdyne
rockets.
Scram!et for the X-15- A small Scramjet was designed and built for the X-15,starting
in 1961. It was tested and flight ready about 1965. But a dummy engine was flight
tested, and caused burn-off of part of the X-15 lower tail. Shortly after, the X-15
program ended.
Lace for the X-15: A detailed design also was made of a simple LACE engine for the
X-15 vehicle. This machine would have had a thrust/weight ratio of about 25, and an
I._ of about 800 sec. By not crowding the state of the art, it could have bought us
invaluable flight experience at a very modest price. Its was not built: one of our
greatest regrets.
Comoutational Tools: Analyses of engine performance and weight, and system
performance were the chief Achilles' heels of these efforts. It is easy to invent new
engine and system concepts many times faster than they can be analyzed. Adequate
analytical tools generally were not available. Where they were possible, the computer
capacity was woefully inadequate. And eachnew Aerospace firm that entered the
fray had to discover anew that their design and performance analysis tools were
inadequate, and set about painfully upgrading. Marquardt kept ahead of the large and
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growing industry effort with a remarkably small team.
Simolified Cycle Analysis: Computers were too slow to do full thermodynamic
property computations for equilibrium combustion gas mixtures in cycle analyses.
Some of the constants involved were still under dispute. Perfect gas-based analyses
became useless above Mach 3 to 4. Air and combustion gas mixture Mollier diagrams
were being painstakingly calculated and drawn by Carl Builder and others, but their
use was tedious.
Starting in 1957 we developed simplified methods of cycle analysis that could bridge
across the supersonic and hypersonic regimes successfully. This required • change of
focus from temperature, Mach number, and delta T, as used in transonic and
supersonic analysis to the right parameters for hypersonic propulsion, which are
• enthalpy, flight velocity, and heat of combustion. The change of focus greatly clarified
our thinking on new engine concepts.The only publications of these methods are Ref
3, and the Appendix of Ref 4.
Boost Effective Soecific Imoulse: The forced wedding of aircraft end rocket trained
personnel in Aerospaceplane design caused (and still causes} great confusion. The two
groups define fuel efficiency as specific impulse versus specific fuel consumption.
They deal with gravity and drag differently. And they differ in emphasis on cruise
versus acceleration. In our efforts to rationalize these opposing viewpoints, we always
expressed air-breathing performance as specific impulse, and then applied system and
trajectory-based gravity and drag corrections in such a way that air-breathing
performance could be integrated, albeit numerically, in the conventional rocket
performance equations•
I,p_(V) = I,p(V)[1 - D/T -(W sin/8)/T] (1)
f
In(W2/Wl) = -l/g_JdV/I,_(V) (2)
This formulation allowed rapid graphical or numerical analyses of system performance.
It was spot-checked, of course, against the full trajectory analyses of various aircraft
firms, and not only gave sufficiently accurate results, but often found flaws in the
more complex programs. It also led to a natural presentation form on semi-Log paper
that gives physical understanding of various system and engine comparisons and
relationships.
Vehicle Conceots:Because of the intimate integration of engine and vehicle
performance, we found it necessary to do our own preliminary vehicle designs. To
answer critics who said the required weight fractions were impossible, in 1959 we
proposed a "Flying Air Mattress" type of pressurized thin shell structure that gave
hope of reaching the required weight. The 1960 version of the "Mattress" is shown
in Figure 4a.
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The very low thrust coefficient of the scramjet above Mach 10 led to much
controversy over whether the engines could be sized large enough to drive the vehicle.
Figure 4b was our attempt 1960 to illustrate how to turn the vehicle into a "flying
engine" that we contended could continue to a Mach number of 20 of higher. Heating
and material problems were admittedly severe.
These drawings and models were displayed in discussions with various airframe
design groups. They had some effect on industry concepts. They were also used as
"strawman" configurations for engine and system performance comparisons in various
in-house studies.
Rules of Thumb: While history may be interesting, or at least amusing, to review, its
real value is found when you find information relevant to the present and the future.
I have looked over this material for the advice most relevant to the RBCC workshop.
My choice is a couple of rules of thumb (Figure 5) that led to what I used to call
"Lindley's Law', a statement of semi-despair.
Dozens of times, we or other teams in the chase, came up with a brilliant new engine
concept or system concept, that promised to give us the payload margin to insure a
successful single stage to orbit. Always, when we ran the total system weight and
performance to ground, a year or more later, weight increases and performance losses
required by the new concept ate up the profit, and we ended up at slightly less than
zero payload. Out of this sad experience were born the following conclusions:
1. All new and better air-breathing SSTO concepts will have a better I.p and therefore
deliver more total weight to orbit.
2. After extensive analysis, a vehicle weight increase and performance losses will be
found that exactly offset the weight gain.
3, The final result for every promising new propulsion or vehicle system therefore will
be exactly the same, namely:
PAYLOAD TO ORBIT EQUALS EXACTLY -1% OF GLOW
With the improvements of modern materials and thermal protection systems, the
baseline may have moved up to + 1% or + 2%. But the basic principle that bright new
ideas get ground down to equality as reality enters the analysis is still with usl
In the first analysis of an improved concept, we tend to gloss over "small'things that
come back to haunt us; weight of air-breathing inlets, their variation with Mach
number, effects of air-breathing trajectories on TPS weight, scale effects on weight
fraction, fuel density effects on weight fraction, etc. It usually takes a great deal of
analysis to find the "second order" effects that can make or break a new concept.
Don't get too enthusiastic too soon!
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RULES OF THUMB
-COMPARED TO ROCKET POWER:
• ALL A/B TYPES WILL HAVE HIGHER I_ OVER SOME SPEED RANGE
• A/B TYPES WILL DELIVER MORE'WEIGHT TO ORBIT
• ALL A/B/TYPES WILL BE HEAVIER; THEREFORI_
• MOST OF THE EXTRAWEIGHT DELIVERED TO ORBIT WILL BE VEHICtJE
LINDLEY'S LAW; 1962
-FOR ALL THE "BEST" A]B ENGINE TYPES YOU CAN INVENT, THE
ORBITAL PAYLOAD WILL BE THE SAME, NAMELY -1% OF GLOW!
• AMENDMENT, 1975: MAKE THAT 0%!
o AMENDMENT, 1990: MAKE THAT +1%!
° AMENDMENT, 1990; FOR ALTITUDE LAUNCH: MAKE THAT ~+2%_!!
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EARLY AIR-AUGMENTED ROCKET, RAMJET, SCRAM JET WORK
D. Van Wie
APL/JHU
(Paper Not Received in Time for Printing)
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